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dismiss for neglect to prosecute under CPLR 3216, he would not
have to adhere to the forty-five-day demand requirement under
that section as a condition for the motion 6 A plaintiff is, there-
fore, well advised to adhere to the defendant's demand for the
complaint. Failure to do so will result in a dismissal of his action
unless the court is satisfied with his excuse and finds sufficient merit
in his cause of action to disregard the delay.
CPLR 3016(c): Bill of particulars not a satisactory alternative for
insufficient cornplaint.
In Pustilaik v. Pustilnik,z the appellate division, second depart-
ment, held that a complaint in a separation action which failed to
specify the time and place of each act complained of was insufficient
pursuant to CPLR 3016(c), and, that such information contained
in a bill of particulars would not be a satisfactory alternative.
It is a rule of construction that one must view specific statutory
enactments in context with relevant general provisions. The
fundamental pleading requirement of the CPLR is contained in
section 3013 which provides that pleadings are sufficient if notice
of the elements of the cause of action or defense is conveyed to
the adversary. In Foley v. D'Agostino,0 s judicial confirmation was
given to the revisers' intent to remove the unsubstantial "technicali-
ties" from the pleading provisions. CPLR 3016(c), s 9 however,
requires that, in a separation action, the time and place of each
act complained of be specifically stated. The problem is, therefore,
whether a failure to comply with the requirements of CPLR
3016(c) should give rise to a dispositive motion under the CPLR.
It is difficult to give a definitive answer to this problem, but
some case law has already indicated a judicial tendency in this
area.90 In Crossett v. Crossett,9 1 a separation action, the court held
that the plaintiff does not cure the omissions in his pleading by
stating them in affidavits opposing a motion to dismiss the complaint.
The court cited Kurcz v. Kurcz,92 which held that a bill of particulars
83 7B McKu NEY'S CPLR 3012, supp. commentary 48, 49-51 (1965); see
also 7B McKiNNEY'S CPLR 3216, supp. commentary 160. 169 (1965).
87 24 App. Div. 2d 868, 264 N.Y.S.2d 400 (2d Dep't 1965).
88 21 App. Div. 2d 60, 248 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1st Dep't 1964).
89 Subdivision (c) of CPLR 3016 is substantially the same as its prede-
cessor RCP 280.
9 0 See, e.g., St Germain v. St. Germain (Sup. Ct. Queens County), 150
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 15, 1963, p. 17, col. 2. The court held therein that the failure
to carry out the requirements of CPLR 3016(c) constituted a defect which
made the pleadings insufficient and subjected them to a motion to dismiss
under CPLR 3211(a) (7).
91 150 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 21, 1963, p. 16, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County).
92 13 App. Div. 2d 954, 216 N.Y.S.2d 736 (1st Dep't 1961). The court in
the instant case also cited Kurcz. See also Rizzi v. Rizzi, 279 App. Div. 676,
108 N.Y.S.2d 324 (2d Dep't 1951).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
could not save a pleading which failed to supply the detail sought
to be included therein. Both of these decisions seem consistent
with the instant case in requiring that a complaint satisfy the
requirements of both CPLR 3013 and CPLR 3016(c).
However, it appears highly doubtful, when viewing the general
approach of the revisers respecting pleading, that the best interests
of justice would be served by dismissing a pleading for any CPLR
3016 omission, provided that the basic CPLR 3013 requirements
are satisfied. It is submitted that a complaint may provide sufficient
notice to apprise a defendant of a separation action against him,
and still not specifically indicate the exact time and place of the
acts complained of. It seems that a pleading should not be dismissed
for an omission if it can be supplied by a bill of particulars, by
affidavits opposing a motion to dismiss, by a disclosure device or
by other means calculated to supply the omitted information. How-
ever, it should be remembered that the basic notice requirements
of CPLR 3013, as portrayed in the Foley case, must always be
satisfied. If the purpose of CPLR 3016(c) is to ensure that the
defendant receives the information specified therein, the means by
which he obtains such information should not be a critical issue.9 3
Such a view would serve to implement the requirements of CPLR
3016, and it would also adhere to the mandate of CPLR 104 which
provides that the CPLR shall be "liberally construed to secure the
just, speedy and inexpensive determination" of every action.
CPLR 3026: Pleading saved where cause of action can be culled
from complaint.
In Barrick v. Barrick,9 4 the appellate division, second depart-
ment, although concurring with the lower court that a cause of
action for reformation was not stated, reversed on the ground that
a valid cause of action could be gathered from the averments of
the complaint. In so holding, the court relied upon CPLR 3026
which mandates a liberal construction of pleadings.
The second sentence of CPLR 3026 states that "defects shall
be ignored if a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced."
The revisers, consistent with the modem attitude toward procedure,
inserted this directive to discourage unnecessary attacks against a
pleading which are designed principally to harass an opponentf 5
93 In the first department, it was indicated that a pleading is not neces-
sarily to be dismissed where the required information can be supplied by
other means. Pernet v. Peabody Eng'r Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 781, 248
N.Y.S.2d 132 (1st Dep't 1964).
94 24 App. Div. 2d 895, 264 N.Y.S.2d 888 (2d Dep't 1965).
9 5 FrST REP. 79.
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